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I. INTRODUCTION
It is hard to imagine what could bring an artist to symbolically and, to some 
extent literally, destroy his own creation. Such was the case with Matt Furie and 
Pepe the Frog. Furie created Pepe more than a decade ago as a character in his 
comic Boy’s Club.1 At the time he was created, Pepe could best be described as
“an anthropomorphic frog that lives with a party wolf, a bear-like creature, and 
then kind of a muppety, dog-like creature . . . in a one-room apartment. And 
[they] kinda just party together and pull pranks on one another and hug each 
other . . . .”2 By 2015, however, the harmless “everyman” that Furie envisioned 
had morphed into something more troubling: the insignia for “alt-right”
extremist groups, a dog whistle for white nationalists, and a badge of honor for 
disaffected Internet trolls.3 In September 2016, the Anti-Defamation League 
(ADL) designated Pepe a hate symbol.4 After concerted efforts by Furie and the 
ADL to reclaim Pepe and restore his image failed, Furie laid Pepe to rest, 
depicting his funeral in a one-page comic.5
Pepe’s story is just one dramatic example of the power of social forces to 
transform the meaning of pieces of popular culture into something dramatically 
different than what the author intended. For other artists, the threat continues to 
loom that their work might be appropriated by individuals, groups, or social 
movements with which they do not agree. One purpose of this Note is to show 
that an increasingly likely source of problems like these is the unauthorized use 
of popular music by political candidates and groups in their activities and 
discourse.
To that end, it is worthwhile to look at another example, involving one of 
America’s largest pop stars, Taylor Swift, and groups similar to those that co-
                                                                                                                     
1 Sam Sanders, What Pepe the Frog’s Death Can Teach Us About the Internet, NPR 
(May 11, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/05/11/527590762/
what-pepe-the-frogs-death-can-teach-us-about-the-internet [https://perma.cc/7SZB-5T5E] 
(describing the creation, corruption, and untimely demise of Pepe).
2 Id.
3 Id. (“[T]he meaning of Pepe as kind of a white nationalist or alt-right symbol kind of 
exploded. It was considered by many to be a tactic of dog-whistling from the Trump 
campaign to that sect of white nationalists online, and it became a new symbol for white 
nationalists maybe not online.”).
4 ADL Adds “Pepe the Frog”Meme, Used by Anti-Semites and Racists, to Online Hate 
Symbols Database, ADL (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-
adds-pepe-the-frog-meme-used-by-anti-semites-and-racists-to-online-hate#.V-rqlvkrJaQ 
[https://perma.cc/65K3-35WV] (explaining that the “Hate on Display” database was 
founded in 2000 as part of the ADL’s effort to track hate groups and help law enforcement 
and education efforts). 
5 Jacey Fortin, Pepe the Frog Is Dead, or So His Creator Hopes, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/us/pepe-the-frog-comic.html 
[https://perma.cc/S7GV-CTCX] (describing Furie’s personal struggles with how his 
character has been used and explaining how Furie’s dramatic attempt to lay his character to 
rest may not ultimately be successful).
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opted Pepe. In late 2017, the left-leaning blog, PopFront, published a piece in 
response to Swift’s new music video, “Look What You Made Me Do.”6 The 
piece suggested that Swift’s music video represented her latest covert message 
to white supremacists that she supports the “re-awakening” of their movement.7
PopFront was building on a narrative, that has gained traction in recent years,
that Swift is a closeted racist.8 Former Breitbart columnist, Milo Yiannopoulos, 
traced the origin of this narrative back to 2013 and a Pinterest account that began 
posting images of Swift accompanied by quotes from Adolf Hitler, supposedly 
doing so to draw attention to the problem of quotes being misattributed to 
celebrities.9 This narrative has been embraced by some members of the alt-right
as well, most notably Andrew Anglin, who runs the white supremacist blog, the 
Daily Stormer.10 Anglin has published dozens of posts about Swift, often 
referring to her as a an “Aryan Goddess.”11
Without speculating on Swift’s political leanings,12 a number of things 
about this story should be concerning to present and future musicians. First, the 
                                                                                                                     
6 Swiftly to the Alt-Right: Taylor Subtly Gets the Lower Case “kkk” in Formation,
POPFRONT (Sept. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Swiftly], http://popfront.us/2017/09/swiftly-to-the
-alt-right-taylor-subtly-get-the-lower-case-kkk-in-formation/ [https://perma.cc/F7XD-
9JE8].
7 Id. (“Taylor’s lyrics in ‘Look What You Made Me Do’ seem to play to the same 
subtle, quiet white support of a racial hierarchy. Many on the alt-right see the song as part of 
a ‘re-awakening,’ in line with Trump’s rise. At one point in the accompanying music video, 
Taylor lords over an army of models from a podium, akin to what Hitler had in Nazis 
Germany. The similarities are uncanny and unsettling.”).
8 Camille Paglia, Camille Paglia Takes on Taylor Swift, Hollywood’s #GirlSquad 
Culture, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/cam
ille-paglia-takes-taylor-swift-845827 [https://perma.cc/AQU2-EZK8] (calling Swift a “Nazi
Barbie”); Mitchell Sunderland, Can’t Shake It Off: How Taylor Swift Became a Nazi Idol,
BROADLY (May 23, 2016), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/ae5x8a/cant-shake-it-off-
how-taylor-swift-became-a-nazi-idol [https://perma.cc/G5VM-VR2L] (describing white 
supremacist groups infatuation with Swift).
9 Milo Yiannopoulos, Taylor Swift Is an Alt-Right Pop Icon, BREITBART (May 11, 
2016), http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2016/05/11/taylor-swift-alt-right-pop-icon/
[https://perma.cc/ADZ6-EB8T].
10 Sunderland, supra note 8 (quoting Anglin as saying “[f]irstly, Taylor Swift is pure 
Aryan goddess, like something out of classical Greek poetry. Athena reborn. . . . It is also an 
established fact that Taylor Swift is secretly a Nazi and is simply waiting for the time when 
Donald Trump makes it safe for her to come out and announce her Aryan agenda to the 
world. Probably, she will be betrothed to Trump’s son, and they will be crowned American 
royalty.”). 
11 Id.
12 When the first draft of this Note was completed, Swift had been maintaining a fairly 
notorious silence regarding her political opinions. Sandra Gonzalez, Taylor Swift No Longer 
Mum on Politics After Endorsing Democrats in Tennessee Midterm Races, CNN (Oct. 8, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/07/entertainment/taylor-swift-politics/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ZL3P-XSSC]. On October 7, 2018, however, Swift broke her silence in a 
post on her Instagram. Taylor Swift (@taylorswift), INSTAGRAM (Oct. 7, 2018), 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BopoXpYnCes/?utm_source=ig_embed
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association between Swift and white supremacists may well have been
predicated on careless, but not necessarily nefarious, actions by third parties.13
Second, Swift may not have done anything to warrant this association, other 
than making some questionable and arguably insensitive creative choices in past 
music videos.14 Third, it is not just her reputation but also the meaning of her 
work that is being affected by this narrative.15
Concerns such as these are the driving motivation for this Note. Its purpose 
is to show that the unauthorized use of music in political campaigns and 
activities presents a unique risk to the moral rights of musicians. As is evident 
in the cases of Furie and Swift, artists can see their creations diminished and 
their meaning called into question based on careless associations with 
problematic ideas. Political campaigns are, perhaps more than anything, 
vehicles for ideas; some noble, some legitimate, some questionable, and some 
troubling.16 When a piece of music is played in a political setting, an association 
is created between that work and the ideas promoted in that setting. The results 
of that association have the potential to be detrimental to the work and its author.
Previous commentators have assigned a term to this phenomenon, 
“decontextualization.”17 For the remainder of this paper, “decontextualization”
will be used to refer to the use of music without an artist’s consent or in settings 
contrary to the music’s intended meaning.
                                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/PRN5-3CEL]. The post contained a fairly lengthy caption, in which Swift 
acknowledged her prior reluctance to wade into politics; endorsed two Democratic 
candidates in Tennessee, Phil Bredesen and Jim Cooper; and encouraged her followers to 
vote. Id. Swift also spoke on issues of discrimination, saying, “I believe that the systemic 
racism we still see in this country towards people of color is terrifying, sickening and 
prevalent. I cannot vote for someone who will not be willing to fight for dignity for ALL 
Americans, no matter their skin color, gender or who they love.” Id.
13 See Yiannopoulos, supra note 9.
14 See Prachi Gupta, Taylor Swift’s Music Video Is Uncomfortable, but Is It Really 
Racist?, SALON (Aug. 20, 2014), https://www.salon.com/2014/08/19/is_taylor_swifts_new_
music_video_offensive/ [https://perma.cc/C84J-3PYG] (analyzing some controversial 
scenes from Swift’s “Shake It Off” music video in which she is depicted wearing gold chains 
and singing as a crew of black female backup dancers twerk around her).
15 Swiftly, supra note 6 (“Taylor’s are lyrics that connect with whites that are concerned 
with what they see as the white dispossession of power. . . . The lyrics validate those who 
feel that [they] have been wronged, e.g. white people angry about a black president.”).
16 See WILLIAM L. BENOIT, COMMUNICATION IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS vii–viii (2007) 
(“Elections are inherently and essentially communicative in nature.”).
17 Sarah C. Anderson, Note, Decontextualization of Musical Works: Should the 
Doctrine of Moral Rights Be Extended, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 869, 
870 (2006) (“decontextualization is the use of an artist’s work in a context with which the 
artist disapproves, thereby altering the integrity of the work.”); see Rajan Desai, Music 
Licensing, Performance Rights Societies, and Moral Rights for Music: A Need in the Current 
U.S. Music Licensing Scheme and a Way to Provide Moral Rights, 10 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (discussing the meaning and thus, context, an artist attaches to a 
particular song).
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The unfortunate consequences of decontextualization can best be avoided 
by the adoption of a meaningful moral rights18 doctrine for musical works in the 
United States. Part II provides necessary background information; namely, the 
history of unauthorized uses of popular music in campaign settings and a brief 
overview of moral rights. Part III discusses the inadequacy of current moral 
rights law in the United States. Part IV includes a case illustration of Browne v. 
McCain, arguably the most notable example of an artist attempting to stop the 
unauthorized use of his music in a campaign, which should reinforce the critique 
offered in Part III and offer a glimpse of the typical arguments offered by 
unauthorized users in response to these allegations of decontextualization. Part 
V discusses how the statutory inadequacies highlighted in Parts III and IV 
coupled with an increasingly polarized and toxic political environment create an 
urgent need for moral rights legislation for music in the United States. Part VI
provides a statutory proposal for new moral rights legislation for musical works 
in the United States. Part VII will briefly conclude.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Unauthorized Uses of Music in Political Campaigns
Oddly enough, the use of popular music in political campaigns is a relatively 
recent phenomenon.19 President Reagan in his 1984 presidential campaign is 
widely considered to be the first to make use of popular music in political 
settings when he started playing Bruce Springsteen’s “Born in the U.S.A.” at 
his rallies in order to convey a sense of “energy and patriotism.”20 Prior to that 
point, campaign music was specially written for the given election.21 Much like 
his modern-day counterparts, Reagan’s use of “Born in the U.S.A” was non-
permissive.22 Springsteen did not approve of Reagan’s use of the song, refusing 
to endorse either Reagan or his opponent, Walter Mondale.23 But since Reagan 
started the trend, “the practice of a political campaigns using popular music 
                                                                                                                     
18 Moral rights theory is a European concept built around the beliefs that artists have a 
relationship with their work that does not end upon its completion or sale and that any harm 
that befalls their work translates into personal harm to the artist. See infra notes 37–42.
19 See Erik Gunderson, Every Little Thing I Do (Incurs Legal Liability): Unauthorized 
Use of Popular Music in Presidential Campaigns, 14 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 137, 139 (1993) 
(describing the shift of use from songs written exclusively for presidential campaigns to the 
more modern unauthorized use of popular music in presidential campaigns).
20 Id. (“Reagan’s re-election campaign also made extensive use of a song by country 
singer Lee Greenwood, ‘God Bless the U.S.A.,’ and played the song in an introductory video 
which ran prior to President Reagan’s speech at the 1984 Republican National 
Convention.”).
21 Id. at 139.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 137 & n.3 (citing Chet Flippo, The 25 Most Intriguing People of 1984: Bruce 
Springsteen, PEOPLE, Dec. 24–31, 1984, at 28).
624 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:3
without authorization has become a feature taken almost for granted in the 
contemporary political landscape.”24
The trend continued in 1988.25 Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis 
utilized Neil Diamond’s “America” at the Democratic National Convention and 
Creedence Clearwater Revival’s “Fortunate Son” and Michael Jackson’s “Man 
in the Mirror” at campaign stops.26 Republican heir apparent George H.W. Bush 
also made use of Lee Greenwood’s “God Bless the U.S.A.” and Bobby 
McFerrin’s “Don’t Worry, Be Happy.”27 The presidential candidates in 2016 
built on this tradition as well.28 Hillary Clinton heavily utilized Rachel Platten’s
hit song, “Fight Song.”29 Then-candidate Donald Trump made use of a variety 
of songs during his campaign that gave rise to a fair amount of controversy.30
His selections and the subsequent controversies will be discussed below.31
B. Trump Controversies
Candidate Trump became embroiled in a number of controversies due to his 
unauthorized uses of popular music in campaign activities.32 The most notable 
instance came in the summer of 2016, when Trump ignited a controversy with 
the renowned British band, The Rolling Stones, by playing their hit song, “Start 
Me Up,” following his victory in the Indiana Republican primary.33 Shortly 
thereafter, Fran Curtis, the band’s publicist stated, “The Rolling Stones have 
never given permission to the Trump campaign to use their songs and have 
                                                                                                                     
24 Id. at 137.
25 Gunderson, supra note 19, at 140. 
26 Id.
27 Id. (noting that McFerrin was a supporter of the Dukakis campaign and did not 
approve of Vice President Bush’s use of his song).
28 See infra notes 28, 30–40.
29 Alyssa Rosenberg, What Hillary Clinton’s Campaign Songs Say that She Can’t,
WASH. POST (July 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2016/07/
29/what-hillary-clintons-campaign-songs-say-that-she-cant/?utm_term=.d191317c955b 
[https://perma.cc/W22P-EPKD]. Platten did an interview about the use of her song by the 
Clinton campaign, during which she stated, “I was a little scared at first just because I knew 
the song meant a lot to a lot of people – and politics, no matter how important, divide us. I 
was a little frightened about that. But I’m proud of how it’s been used. I don’t have any
regrets about it.” Mikael Wood, Rachel Platten on Hillary Clinton’s Use of ‘Fight Song’: ‘I
Was a Little Scared at First,’ L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), http://beta.latimes.com/entertain
ment/music/la-et-ms-rachel-platten-fight-song-hillary-clinton-20161108-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LBC9-GWGU].
30 See infra notes 30–40.
31 Id.
32 Deena Zaru & Jim Acosta, Get Off My Song! Stones to Trump, CNN: POLITICS (Aug. 
16, 2017) http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/05/politics/rolling-stones-donald-trump/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6T5T-42GH].
33 Id.
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requested that they cease all use immediately.”34 Trump also had run-ins with 
Adele,35 Neil Young,36 Steven Tyler,37 and R.E.M.38 In each case, the Trump 
campaign was utilizing the music without permission from the author or the 
copyright owner.39 This growing trend of unauthorized use and increasing 
hostility between candidates and artists is one of the primary motivations for 
this Note.
The controversies have continued into Trump’s presidency. On October 27, 
2018, hours after a mass shooting at Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania that left eleven people dead, Trump played Pharrell Williams’ hit 
song “Happy” at a political event for the upcoming midterm elections.40 Two 
days later, through counsel, Pharrell sent President Trump a cease-and-desist 
letter, in which the artist indicated that the song was inappropriate given the 
circumstances, that he had not and would not grant Trump permission to use the 
song, and that the unauthorized use constituted copyright and trademark 
infringement.41 On November 4, 2018, Trump received criticism from two other 
artists, Rihanna and Axl Rose of Guns N’ Roses, for using their music at 
campaign events without permission.42
                                                                                                                     
34 Id. Days after this explicit denial of permission, Trump used another one of the 
band’s songs, “You Can’t Always Get What You Want,” at a rally in West Virginia. Id.
35 Jeremy Diamond, Adele: Donald Trump Doesn’t Have Permission to Use My Music,
CNN (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/01/politics/adele-donald-trump-music/
[https://perma.cc/Q6CS-V6CF].
36 Rebekah Metzler, Probably Not a Lot More Rocking in Donald Trump’s Free World,
CNN (June 17, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/16/politics/donald-trump-2016-neil-
young-song/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q7YY-PYLL].
37 Zaru & Acosta, supra note 32.
38 Jason Newman, R.E.M. to Trump, Other Pols: ‘Go F–k Yourselves’ for Using Our 
Music, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/r-e-m-
to-trump-other-pols-go-f--k-yourselves-for-using-our-music-20150909 [https://perma.cc/D
T9T-CH8N].
39 See supra notes 27–33.
40 Amy B. Wang, ‘Happy’Was Played at a Trump Event After the Pittsburgh Massacre. 
Now Pharrell Is Threatening to Sue Him., WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2018/10/30/trump-played-happy-an-
event-after-pittsburgh-massacre-now-pharrell-wants-sue-him/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.
e41155da7ffa [https://perma.cc/9PWW-WRL8].
41 Id.
42 Lisa Respers France, Rihanna Wants Trump to Stop the Music, CNN (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://www-m.cnn.com/2018/11/05/entertainment/rihanna-trump-music/index.html?r=http
s%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F [https://perma.cc/4XXF-UMTX]. Rose also accused 
Trump of exploiting loopholes in “blanket performance licenses” for event venues, a topic 
which will be discussed in a later Part. Id.
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C. What Are Moral Rights?
Before preceding any further, a brief introduction to the concept of moral 
rights is necessary. Droit Moral, or moral rights theory, is a European concept,43
predicated on the belief “that an artist’s relationship with his creation does not 
end upon its completion.”44 Unlike a factory worker who is responsible for the 
creation of a cog that is mass-produced, an artist is responsible for the creation 
of a work that is “created from [a] unique vision.”45 That unique relationship 
between the artist and their work makes the artist “vulnerable to certain personal 
harms.”46 An artist’s work is, in many ways, an extension of herself, and thus
when her work is subject to action that might be considered prejudicial or 
harmful, the harm is not isolated to the work but translates to the artist as well.47
In this way, moral rights are fundamentally different from economic rights, 
which are alienable and transferable.48
Despite being fundamentally different from economic rights, moral rights, 
like economic rights, exist primarily to incentivize creation.49 Moral rights seek 
to “protect the artist’s creative process by protecting the artist’s control over that 
process and the finished work of art.”50 In a world where artists have confidence 
about the treatment they and their works will receive, they are more inclined to 
create.51
In Europe, four distinct moral rights are recognized: paternity, disclosure, 
withdrawal, and integrity.52 Presently in the United States, only two of these 
rights are recognized, integrity and paternity (otherwise known as the right of 
                                                                                                                     
43 See generally Dan Rosen, Artists’Moral Rights: A European Evolution, an American 
Revolution, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155, 155 (1983) (detailing the French legal 
system’s conception of artists’ moral rights).
44 Id. at 156.
45 Id. (describing how works of art are not fungible).
46 Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 41, 42–43 (1998) (likening the harm suffered by artists whose moral rights are violated 
to individuals who have theirs rights of personality or personal civil rights violated).
47 Id. at 43 (“When an artist creates, she produces something that allows others a 
glimpse into her individual human consciousness. . . . The artist stands uniquely open to 
attack upon her psyche because she is so closely connected to the creative process and the 
creative product. . . . The artist’s reaction [to harm to her work] may even resemble her 
reaction to a physical injury to herself or someone very close to her.”).
48 Id. at 44 (“Moral rights, which protect a unique extension of the self, remain personal 
to the artist. The artist cannot sell them, give them away, or bequeath them.”).
49 See id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Rosen, supra note 43, at 155. Moreover, France has created an additional “resale 
right,” which allows an artist to receive compensation each additional time the work is sold. 
Id. Some commentators do not conceive of the resale right as being a moral right due to its 
economic character, but it shares some similarities with moral rights in that it evinces a 
continuing relationship between the work and the artist, so it warrants mentioning here. Id.
at 155–56.
2019] THE DECONTEXTUALIZATION OF MUSIC 627
attribution),53 so discussion from this point forward will eschew further mention 
of the rights of withdrawal and disclosure.54 The right of integrity is generally 
regarded as allowing artists to prevent any distortion, mutilation, modification, 
or other derogatory action in relation to their work, which would prejudice their 
reputations.55 The right of attribution is two-fold: it allows artists to (1) claim 
credit for works they have created and (2) disclaim credit for works they have 
not created.56
III. GAPS IN U.S. MORAL RIGHTS LAW
A. Statutory Inadequacy
In 1988, the United States became a signatory to the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.57 The purpose of this treaty was 
to “harmonize moral and economic rights, so that both [types] of rights would 
coexist when a work of authorship materialized.”58 Initially, the United States 
was motivated to join the Berne Convention in order to obtain the benefit of 
copyright protections afforded by other signatory countries.59 However, along 
with these benefits came certain obligations, including those in Article 6bis, 
which grants authors a right of attribution and right of integrity in their works.60
Notably, the Berne Convention does include “musical compositions” in its 
definition of covered works.61
Prior to passing the Berne Convention Implementation Act (BCIA), 
Congress debated the necessity of new statutory provisions to comply with 
                                                                                                                     
53 The only existing moral rights law in the United States exists in the Visual Artists 
Rights Act (VARA), which creates a right of integrity and attribution for works of visual art. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (providing authors of certain works the rights to “attribution and 
integrity”). VARA will be discussed in the greater detail in the following Parts. See infra
notes 67–70.
54 For the sake of clarity, the right of disclosure allows artists to refuse to expose their 
work to the public before they feel it is satisfactory. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, 
Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 95, 96 (1997). The right of withdrawal, sometimes referred to as the right of 
retraction, allows artists to withdraw their work, even after it has left their hands. Id.
55 Id. at 99 (citing Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
art. 6bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (as 
amended on Sept. 28, 1979)).
56 Id. at 130 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A).
57 Aurele Danoff, The Moral Rights Act of 2007: Finding the Melody in the Music, 1 J.
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 181, 186 (2007); Deborah Ross, The United States Joins the 
Berne Convention: New Obligations for Authors’ Moral Rights?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363, 363 
(1990).
58 Danoff, supra note 57, at 185.
59 See id. at 185–86. One of greatest benefits of membership in the Berne Union is that 
every signatory enjoys the copyright protections of all other signatories. Id. at 186.
60 Berne Convention, supra note 55, at art. 6bis(1).
61 Id. at art. 2(1).
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requirements of Article 6bis.62 Congress ultimately concluded that the United 
States could meet its obligations under Article 6bis based on an existing 
“patchwork” of state and federal laws.63 This patchwork of remedies relies on 
three crucial threads. The first is Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which 
addresses false designations of origin and false descriptions and could, in some 
limited circumstances, be applied in attribution disputes over copyrighted 
works.64 The second includes a number of provisions of the Copyright Act, 
which protect authors’ exclusive rights in derivatives of their work, place limits 
on licensees’ rights to alter and arrange musical compositions, and allow for the 
termination of licenses and transfers.65 The third comprises various state and 
local laws addressing rights of publicity, contractual relations, fraudulent 
activity, unfair competition, defamation, and privacy.66
In 1990, Congress implicitly acknowledged that this patchwork did not 
provide adequate protection of moral rights when it passed the Visual Artists
Rights Acts (VARA).67 VARA grants waivable rights of attribution and 
integrity68 to authors of “works of visual art.”69 While VARA constitutes the 
most substantial commitment to moral rights by the United States to date, it still 
falls noticeably short of the obligations the United States incurred by becoming 
a signatory to the Berne Convention. The Act’s most significant shortcoming is 
evident in its title: it only applies to visual works, and not even all visual works 
but rather a few narrowly defined categories.70 VARA’s limited scope leaves 
authors of “musical compositions,” mentioned in Article 2(1) of the Berne 
Convention, without any moral rights protections.
                                                                                                                     
62 Notice of Inquiry: Study on the Moral Rights of Attribution and Integrity, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 7870, 7871 (Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry] (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-
609, at 33 (1988)).
63 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 9–10 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 37–38 
(1988)).
64 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)) (2012)).
65 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2), 115(a)(2), 203 (2012)).
66 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 34 (1988)) (noting the important role that 
contract law plays for authors attempting to control aspects of their economic and moral 
rights).
67 See id. at 7871–72. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (providing morals rights to authors of 
certain works in the form of attribution and integrity).
68 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
69 Id. § 101.
70 Id. According to the Act, a “work of visual art” is
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition 
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in
the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer 
that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other 
identifying mark of the author; or (2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition 
purposes only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited 
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. 
Id.
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The United States Copyright Office seems to have taken notice of these 
deficiencies. In January 2017, the Office issued a Notice of Inquiry, inviting 
public comment on the status of moral rights law in the United States.71 The 
Copyright Office stated that part of its goal was to determine “whether any 
additional protection is advisable in [the area of moral rights].”72 Prior to issuing 
the Notice, the Copyright Office organized a symposium that covered the 
history of moral rights, their value to authors, the extent to which they are 
protected by current law, and the effect of technological innovation on moral 
rights.73 Interestingly, the issue of unauthorized use of music in political 
campaigns was briefly addressed during the symposium.74
The enactment of VARA in 1990 and the 2017 Notice of Inquiry highlight 
an important reality. At the time the United States became a signatory to the 
Berne Convention and even still today, the statutory schemes that predated the 
BCIA were and are inadequate to protect the moral rights of authors of musical 
works.
B. Contractual Protections
While statutory provisions give rise to more uniform protection of authors’
moral rights, authors are not left entirely helpless in the absence of such laws.
In negotiating licensing agreements and contracts with record labels, some 
authors may be able to contract for their moral rights.75 American copyright law 
has given rise to a fairly complex music licensing regime.76 While a variety of 
licenses are provided for in this system, the most important among them are 
performance licenses, which allow the licensee to perform a work publicly.77
According to the Copyright Act, “[t]o perform or display a work ‘publicly’
                                                                                                                     
71 Notice of Inquiry, supra note 62, at 7874 (“The Copyright Office seeks public 
comments addressing how existing law, including provisions found in title 17 of the U.S. 
Code as well as other federal and state laws, affords authors with effective protection of their 
rights, equivalent to those of moral rights of attribution and integrity.”).
72 Id. at 7870.
73 Id. at 7874 (“As part of its effort to begin a dialogue about moral rights protections 
in the United States, the Copyright Office organized symposium entitled ‘Authors, 
Attribution, and Integrity: Examining Moral Rights in the United States,’ which was held on 
Apr. 18, 2016.”). The results of the symposium were mixed, with some participants 
remarking that the existing patchwork of laws does provide adequate protection and others 
indicating that the patchwork is under-inclusive and ineffective. Id.
74 Chris Castle et al., Authors, Attribution, and Integrity: New Ways to Disseminate 
Content and the Impact on Moral Rights, 8 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 125, 137 (2016) 
[hereinafter Symposium]. Specifically, Scott Martin, Executive Vice President of 
Intellectual Property for Paramount Pictures, remarked that the risk of decontextualization 
that might run afoul of an artist’s moral rights is greater with musical works. Id. at 125, 137.
75 See Desai, supra note 17, at 4–10. 
76 For a thorough discussion of music licensing in the United States, see id.
77 Id. at 7 (“The performance right is the most important right for songwriters and music 
publishers, with one-half of total music publishing returns arising from revenue associated 
with public performances.”).
630 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:3
means—(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place 
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and 
its social acquaintances is gathered . . . .”78 Thus, public performances would 
include things like “radio and television broadcasts, the playing of a record, or 
the singing of a song.”79
While performance rights are the most important to musicians and other 
licensors, policing public performances remains an incredibly difficult task.80
This enforcement problem has given rise to institutions known as “performing 
rights societies,” which assume the responsibility for safeguarding these 
rights.81 In the United States, the two most popular performing rights societies 
are the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and 
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).82 An artist or other copyright owner can contract 
with one of these societies to sublicense his or her work to others.83 Individuals 
seeking to use the music in a public setting would pay the society for either an 
annual, blanket license or a per program license.84 Upon receiving payment for 
the license, the society then distributes royalties to the artist.85
Performing rights societies provide a valuable resource to artists in policing 
their economic rights, but they are presently not well constituted to protect moral 
rights and may, in some circumstances, jeopardize them further.86 Thus, with
respect to performing rights societies, artists are left in an uncomfortable 
position. They must join in order to protect their economic interests, but in doing 
                                                                                                                     
78 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also id.
79 Desai, supra note 17, at 7. But see 17 U.S.C. § 110 (describing limitations on the 
exclusive right to public performances, including exceptions for educational purposes, 
religious purposes, and public broadcasting).
80 Desai, supra note 17, at 7 (“[Musical work owners] would have a very difficult time 
policing performances in restaurants, stadiums, bars, or any other public place to retain their 
economic interest in the performance right.”).
81 Id. (explaining that the role of performing rights societies is to “license use of musical 
works, police their use, and distribute royalties based on use of these works”). If the society 
finds evidence of unauthorized uses, it is authorized by its members to bring suit against 
suspected infringers. Id. at 8.
82 See id. at 7 (listing ASCAP and BMI as performance rights societies in the United 
States). Outside the United States, the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, 
now known only as SESAC, Inc., is a prominent performing rights society. Id.
83 Id. at 8.
84 Desai, supra note 17, at 8 (“A person or entity that desires to obtain a performance 
license from a performing rights society can pay an annual fee for a blanket license that 
allows the licensee to perform one or more titles in the society’s music catalog. A per 
program license is also available to television stations seeking a license from a performing 
rights society.”).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 8, 21 (“[A]ny musician would be wise to join a performance rights society, but 
in doing so, the musician allows another entity to decide in what context the public 
performance of his or her song occurs. A song could be played out of context in a stadium, 
convention center, bar, radio broadcast, or anywhere else ASCAP and BMI can license 
public performances.”).
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so, they sacrifice control of the contexts in which their works are used.87 The 
societies would likely say these concerns are overblown, at least with respect to 
the use of music in political settings. According to guidelines issued by ASCAP, 
its performance licenses for most venues exclude uses at conventions and other 
political events.88 While that is technically true, the venues may also simply 
purchase a license specifically for conventions and other similar meetings.89
Theoretically, an artist could contract for restrictions on how his or her
works are licensed by a performing rights society, but presently, this does not 
appear to be a common, or even uncommon, occurrence. Additionally, artists 
would not have much leverage in requesting these restrictions. Artists cannot 
effectively police the use of their work without ASCAP or BMI, and these 
organizations likely would not be willing to accept the inclusion of specific
restrictions on individual works because they would interfere with the uniform 
treatment the organizations accord to their entire catalog within their licenses.
That being said, there is some evidence suggesting that artists have sought 
greater protection for their moral rights in negotiations with record labels and 
publishing companies.90 In fact, artists typically request “marketing 
restrictions,” which prevent these entities from licensing their work for things 
like advertising or use in motion pictures.91 While some restrictions have 
become commonplace, if an artist has an interest in preventing any particular 
type of use, it becomes purely a matter of her ability to negotiate for such a 
restriction.92
Most commentators, however, discount the effectiveness of these 
contractual safeguards.93 Chief among their concerns is a lack of awareness on 
behalf of disadvantaged authors who are so eager to sell their work that they 
might be willing to sign away their moral rights.94 This risk is substantially 
greater when the publishing company is allowed to use form purchase 
agreements that require an author to surrender his or her rights of attribution and 
integrity.95
                                                                                                                     
87 Id. at 21 (“A musician would act foolishly by not enrolling in one of these groups, 
and likely, a record company would act foolishly if it allowed an artist on its label to not join 
one of these groups.”).
88 See Using Music in Political Campaigns: What You Should Know, ASCAP
https://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/advocacy-legislation/political_campaign.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RVG9-9SJB].
89 See ASCAP Music License Agreements and Reporting Forms, ASCAP
https://www.ascap.com/music-users/licensefinder [https://perma.cc/HR69-2JKH].
90 See Symposium, supra note 74, at 135–36. 
91 Id. at 135.
92 Id. at 135–36. (describing leverage dynamics between artists and record labels in 
negotiating for non-standard market restrictions).
93 See Ross, supra note 57, at 373–74.
94 See id. at 373.
95 Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension 
of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1560 (1972) (describing how 
“commercial giants” in the music industry often utilize form contracts with granting clauses 
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In conclusion, with respect to contractual safeguards for moral rights, they 
seem to suffer from a few fatal flaws. First, contracting for them will inevitably 
decrease the value of the artists’ economic rights. Second, most artists would be 
precluded from negotiating for them due to insufficient bargaining power.
IV. BROWNE V. MCCAIN: ARGUING FOR THE POLITICIANS
In the past, some artists have employed these tactics and legal theories in 
attempts to curtail acts of decontextualization by political candidates and 
campaigns. However, these cases are rarely ever decided on the merits and 
instead are resolved in settlements out of court.96 Even so, some courts have 
been forced to address the relevance of the aforementioned legal doctrines in 
deciding preliminary motions.97 Hopefully, in reviewing Browne v. McCain,
arguably the most famous instance of this type of litigation, the uncertainty in 
this area of law will become clearer in a few specific ways. First, both the parties
and the courts must jump through tremendous hoops in an attempt to shoehorn 
the essence of these complaints into the legal frameworks Congress deemed 
sufficient to protect moral rights. Second, despite their great efforts, these 
primarily economic doctrines cannot effectively resolve moral rights questions.
Finally, this case will provide an adequate summary of the types of defenses that 
have been and likely will be asserted by political candidates in these disputes, 
should the current legal regime remain unchanged.
In August of 2008, Senator John McCain was in the midst of a campaign 
for the presidency of the United States against Senator Barack Obama.98 In 
anticipation of a visit to Ohio by Obama, the Ohio Republican Party (ORP), 
acting on behalf of Senator McCain and the Republican National Committee 
(RNC), produced a web video attacking Senator Obama’s proposed energy 
policy.99 In keeping with the theme of the advertisement, the ORP added select 
clips from Jackson Browne’s iconic song “Running on Empty” to the 
advertisement.100 The ORP first published the advertisement on YouTube, but 
                                                                                                                     
that require authors to surrender their rights to paternity and integrity as a precondition to 
sale of their work). 
96 See, e.g., Byrne v. Crist, No. 810CV01187, 2010 WL 2833809 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 
2011); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal 2010); Browne v. McCain, 611 
F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
97 See, e.g., Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Order Re Senator 
McCain’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim”).
98 Id. at 1076.
99 Id.; see also Eveline Chao, Stop Using My Song: 35 Artists Who Fought Politicians 
Over Their Musics, ROLLING STONE (July 8, 2015), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/
lists/stop-using-my-song-34-artists-who-fought-politicians-over-their-music-20150708/
jackson-browne-vs-john-mccain-20150629 [https://perma.cc/RN2U-UPNQ].
100 See sources cited supra note 99; see also JACKSON BROWNE, Running on Empty, on
RUNNING ON EMPTY (Asylum Records 1977) (including lyrics such as “Running on-running 
on empty, Running on-running blind, Running on-running into the sun, But I’m running 
behind”).
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it also aired on television and cable networks across Ohio and Pennsylvania.101
After the advertisement aired, “Browne [] received numerous inquiries 
expressing concern about Defendants’ use of [Running on Empty . . . ].”102
Browne then brought a suit in the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California against Senator McCain, the RNC, and the ORP alleging, 
among other things, (1) copyright infringement, (2) violation of the Lanham 
Act’s prohibitions on false association or endorsement, and (3) violation of 
California’s common law right of publicity.103
A. Copyright Infringement
In July 2009, the parties settled this case out of court,104 but before a 
settlement was reached, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss all of Browne’s
claims.105 In response to Browne’s allegations of copyright infringement, 
Senator McCain argued that the claim should be dismissed because the 
advertisement was covered by the fair use doctrine.106 Fair use was a common 
law doctrine that was codified in the Copyright Act; it exempts from 
infringement claims, uses of copyrighted works “for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research.”107 The court 
ultimately concluded that it did not have enough facts at the time to make a 
proper ruling on fair use and consequently denied Senator McCain’s motion to 
dismiss the copyright infringement claim.108
                                                                                                                     
101 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1077 (“The commercial was also aired on and discussed 
by the national news media, including MSNBC.”).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 David C. Johnston, The Singer Did Not Approve This Message: Analyzing the 
Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Music in Political Advertisements in Jackson Browne v. 
John McCain, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687 (2010) (“The settlement required 
Defendants to issue a public apology and pledge to get artists’ permission before using music 
in the future.”); see also Daniel Kreps, Jackson Browne Settles with GOP Over “Running on 
Empty” Ad Use, ROLLING STONE (July 21, 2009), https://www.rollingstone.com/music
/music-news/jackson-browne-settles-with-gop-over-running-on-empty-ad-use-250454/
[https://perma.cc/DJV5-8QM7]. 
105 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
106 Id. at 1077.
107 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107). In evaluating claims of “fair use,” courts consider the 
following factors: (1) purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is 
commercial or for non-profit educational purposes; (2) nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 
amount and substantiality of the portion of the work used in relation to the work as a whole; 
and (4) effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006). Interestingly, the fair use doctrine functions as an exception not only to the exclusive 
economic rights granted to copyright owners in § 106 but also to the moral rights granted to 
authors of visual works in § 106A.
108 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
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B. Trademark Infringement
More enlightening was the court’s discussion of Browne’s claim of false 
endorsement under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.109 Senator McCain 
offered three arguments in his motion to dismiss: (1) the provisions of the 
Lanham Act only apply to commercial speech, not political speech; (2) the claim 
is barred by the First Amendment and artistic relevance test; and (3) Browne 
cannot, as a legal matter, establish a likelihood of confusion.110 The court did 
not find Senator McCain’s argument about commercial speech compelling, 
concluding that the statute’s “in commerce” language was not intended as a limit 
on the type of speech that the Lanham Act applies to.111 Relying on Second 
Circuit precedent, the court stated definitively that the Lanham Act applies to 
both commercial and noncommercial speech, including political speech.112
The court then turned to Senator McCain’s argument that Browne’s claim 
should be dismissed because it is barred under the First Amendment.113 The 
First Amendment arguments were essentially an extension of Senator McCain’s
noncommercial speech argument; since the advertisement is an act of 
noncommercial, political expression, it should not be constrained by trademark 
infringement claims.114 As the court already stated, the Lanham Act can be 
applied to noncommercial speech, and thus, without more compelling reasons, 
the First Amendment cannot function as a bar to Browne’s trademark 
infringement claims.115
Senator McCain made one final argument that the trademark infringement 
claim should be dismissed because the advertisement clearly identifies its source 
as the ORP and thus there is no likelihood of confusion as to where it came 
                                                                                                                     
109 Id. at 1078–81.
110 Id. at 1078–79.
111 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 
[T]he Act’s reference to use “in commerce” actually “reflects Congress’s intent to 
legislate to the limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause” to regulate interstate 
commerce. The interstate commerce jurisdictional predicate for the Lanham Act merely 
requires a party to show that the defendant’s conduct affects interstate commerce, such 
as through diminishing the plaintiff’s ability to control use of the mark, thereby 
affecting the mark and its relationship to interstate commerce.
Id. (citing United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand Am. N.Y.C., Inc., 128 F.3d 86,
92 (2d Cir. 1997)).
112 Id. at 1079 (“Indeed, the Act’s purpose of reducing consumer confusion supports 
application of the Act to political speech, where the consequences of widespread confusion 
as to the source of such speech should be dire.”).
113 Id. at 1080. Senator McCain also argued that the claim was barred under the “artistic 
relevance” test, a doctrine adopted by certain jurisdictions regarding the use of trademarks 
in artistic works. Id. The artistic relevance arguments will not be discussed here because of 
the test’s limited jurisdictional scope.
114 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant John McCain’s
Motion to Dismiss, at 15–19; Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
115 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
2019] THE DECONTEXTUALIZATION OF MUSIC 635
from.116 However, as the court pointed out, the Senator’s argument 
misunderstands the confusion requirement of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).117
Even though a viewer may not be confused by the actual source of the 
advertisement, given the explicit identifier, there is a still a reasonable likelihood 
that a viewer might be confused as to whether Browne endorsed Senator 
McCain.118
C. Right of Publicity
Browne’s final cause of action was a common law Right of Publicity Claim, 
which alleged, among other things, that Senator McCain’s “usurpation of 
Browne’s identity has caused and will cause irreparable harm to Browne that 
cannot be fully compensated by money.”119 Browne further alleged that, 
because of this reputational harm, he was entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting 
the Defendants from showing the advertisement in the future and punitive 
damages sufficient to deter similar conduct in the future.120 In response, Senator 
McCain filed an “Anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation) motion, which are designed to prevent lawsuits intended to chill 
the valid exercise of constitutional speech rights.121 California’s Anti-SLAPP 
statute deploys a burden shifting framework to adequately balance the interests 
of the parties.122 The initial burden is placed on the defendant to show that the 
plaintiff’s claims arise from an act made in connection with an issue of public 
                                                                                                                     
116 Id.
117 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (prohibiting uses of trademarks “in 
commerce . . . which [are] likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities.”).
118 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1080–81. The court also took issue with Senator 
McCain’s failure to address what are known as the Sleekcraft factors, which are used in 
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists and include
(1) the strength of the mark, (2) proximity or relatedness of the goods, (3) similarity of 
the marks, (4) evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels used, (6) degree of 
care customers are likely to exercise in purchasing the goods, (7) defendant’s intent in 
selecting the mark, and (8) likelihood of expansion into other markets. 
Id. (citing KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 608 (9th 
Cir. 2005)).
119 Complaint at 9, Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 
CV08-05334 RGK) [hereinafter Browne Complaint]. The prima facie case for a claim under 
California’s common law right of publicity requires a showing of “(1) the defendant’s use of 
the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s
advantage commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.” Browne,
611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (citing White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 
1397 (9th Cir. 1992)).
120 Browne Complaint, supra note 119, at 9.
121 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1065, 1067.
122 Id.
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interest.123 If the defendant meets their burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff 
to establish a probability of success on the merits of his claim at trial.124 The 
court did find that the action that prompted the complaint related to an issue of 
public interest125 but ultimately concluded that Browne had shown a probability 
of success at trial.126 Thus, the court denied Senator McCain’s motion to dismiss 
the right of publicity claim.127
D. Reflections on Browne
As mentioned earlier, the value of this case comes from its ability to 
illuminate the deficiencies of the so-called “patchwork” of laws that Congress 
deemed sufficient to account for authors’ moral rights. First, it makes clear that 
these economic-minded legal doctrines are poorly suited to the primarily non-
economic interests of the parties in these suits.128 This is best reflected in the 
court’s discussion of Browne’s trademark infringement claim. The court notes 
that other circuits have determined that the Lanham Act applies to both 
commercial and noncommercial speech, but in resolving this dispute the court 
returns the most basic purposes of the Act and trademark law in general, to 
“reduc[e] consumer confusion.”129 Thus, even if it is true that the Lanham Act 
was intended to regulate both commercial and noncommercial speech, its 
interest in doing so is still primarily, if not purely, economic.130 While 
trademark legislation that is economically-focused is not problematic in the area 
of traditional trademark disputes, that focus can become problematic when it is 
applied to non-economic claims.131 When the court is required to do this much 
work merely to show the applicability of the Lanham Act to the claim in 
question, it should be a strong indication that the Act is not well-suited to that 
claim.
The claim that seemed most similar to a moral rights claim was Browne’s
right of publicity claim. A right of publicity claim acknowledges, at least 
implicitly, that the author’s identity is tied up in their work.132 At the very least, 
this indicates an awareness of the reputational harm that accompanies actions 
like those of Senator McCain. Even so, the right of publicity fails to adequately 
                                                                                                                     
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1067–68.
125 Id. at 1068–69.
126 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
127 Id. at 1073.
128 See Ross, supra note 57, at 364. (discussing the United States’ preoccupation with 
economic interests in intellectual property law).
129 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
130 See id.
131 See Ross, supra note 57, at 364.
132 Browne Complaint, supra note 119, at 9 (“Browne’s distinct and readily identifiable 
voice is widely known and closely associated with Browne. As such, Defendants’
unauthorized use of Browne’s voice in the Commercial invoked Browne’s identity in the 
minds of the public.”).
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protect moral rights for a number of reasons. First, there is still a preoccupation 
with present and future economic harm.133 But more importantly than that, the 
right of publicity is a common law doctrine that can be subject to differences 
from state to state, with some providing stronger enforcement mechanisms than 
others,134 making the patchwork more vulnerable to holes than it would be in 
the presence of federal legislation.
V. URGENCY: THE TROUBLE OF DECONTEXTUALIZATION IN A 
TURBULENT POLITICAL CLIMATE
In addition to the clear deficiencies of the existing patchwork of protections 
of moral rights for musical works, the increasingly turbulent political climate
underscores the need for a new moral rights doctrine for musical works. This 
Part describes the growing trend of political polarization and discusses how this 
trend exacerbates the risk of personal and reputation harm to artists resulting 
from decontextualization of music in political campaigns and settings.
Presently, there is a growing divide among the American public on the basis 
of political affiliation, with respect to fundamental political values, including 
the role of government, race relations, immigration, and environmental 
protection.135 For example, according to the Pew Research Center, political 
polarization reached then-record levels during the presidency of Barack 
Obama.136 However, in the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency, the 
political divide has grown even wider.137 Presently, a vibrant debate is taking
                                                                                                                     
133 Id. (“Defendants usurpation of Browne’s identity has caused and will cause 
irreparable harm to Browne that cannot be fully compensated by money.”).
134 See PUBLICITY, CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/publicity [https://perma.cc/5VSV-KXBW]; RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, THOMSON REUTERS
(2019), https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/right-of-publicity.html 
[https://perma.cc/ADD8-FBUY]. 
135 See THE PARTISAN DIVIDE ON POLITICAL VALUES GROWS EVEN WIDER, PEW RES.
CTR. (2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-
values-grows-even-wider/ [https://perma.cc/C7L4-2Y7N] (finding that the magnitude of the 
divisions between Republicans and Democrats on key political issues “dwarfs other divisions 
in society, along such lines as gender, race and ethnicity, religious observance or education”).
136 Id.
137 Id.
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place regarding the cause of this polarization,138 and whether it is a passing or 
permanent phenomenon.139
Understanding the relationship between this political divide and 
reputational concerns for artists is slightly more complicated though. It begins 
with the understanding that the political party has become an increasingly 
important form of social identity.140 As might be expected, when political 
affiliation becomes a form of social identity, individuals begin to harbor positive 
feelings toward members of their party and similarly intense hostile feelings 
toward members of the alternative party.141 Furthermore, it is clear that these 
attitudes have increased in intensity in recent decades.142 The particularly 
unfortunate thing about these divides, commonly referred to as affective 
polarization, is that they are not constrained by social norms in the same ways 
as gender and race-based divides.143 In fact, the divide is often encouraged by 
                                                                                                                     
138 See, e.g., Lexi Boxel et al., Greater Internet Use Is Not Associated with Faster 
Growth in Political Polarization Among US Demographic Groups, 114 (40) PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 10612, 10612 (2017) (arguing that greater Internet use is not the cause of 
increasing polarization); John V. Duca & Jason L. Saving, Income Inequality, Media 
Fragmentation, and Increased Political Polarization, 35 (2) CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 392, 
392 (2016) (attributing polarization to fragmentation in American news media and income 
inequality); Kristin N. Garrett & Alexa Bankert, The Moral Roots of Partisan Division: How 
Moral Conviction Heightens Affective Polarization, BRIT. J. POL. SCI. (2018) (arguing that 
political polarization is caused and amplified in part by individuals’ willingness to moralize 
partisan political stances).
139 Compare Jane Mansbridge, Three Reasons Political Polarization Is Here to Stay,
WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/03
/11/three-reasons-political-polarization-is-here-to-stay/?utm_term=.034f2f6c4124 [https://perma.cc/
M4DJ-M2QX] (arguing that political polarization is not likely recede in the near future), 
with Robert Y. Shapiro, Can Young Voters Break the Cycle of Polarization, WASH. POST.
(Jan. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/20/can-
young-voters-break-the-cycle-of-polarization/?utm_term=.f21454c6f741 [https://perma.cc/HQL5-
UDRB] (arguing that Republicans can end the cycle of polarization by compromising on 
several social issues of particular important to millennials).
140 Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New 
Evidence of Group Polarization, 59 (3) AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690 (2014) (“While early 
studies viewed partisanship as a manifestation of other group affiliations . . . more recent 
work suggests that party is an important form of social identity in its own right . . . .”).
141 Id. at 692 (“[D]espite only mixed evidence of sharp ideological or partisan 
divergence in their policy preferences, Americans increasingly dislike people and groups on 
the other side of the political divide and face no social repercussions for the open expression 
of these attitudes.”); see also The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider: 
Partisan Animosity, Personal Politics, Views of Trump, PEW RES. CTR. (2017) (“Among 
members of both parties, the shares with very unfavorable opinions of the other party have 
more than doubled since 1994.”).
142 Iyengar & Westwood, supra note 140.
143 Id. (“Unlike race, gender, and other social divides where group-related attitudes and 
behavior are constrained by social norms . . . there are no corresponding pressures to temper 
disapproval of political opponents.”).
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and reflected in national political discourse.144 As political affiliation has grown 
in importance as a form of social identity, what was once merely a political 
divide has morphed into a social divide.145 Thus, affiliation of oneself or one’s
work with a particular political ideology has the capacity to seriously and 
negatively impact one’s social identity.
Political polarization does not, in and of itself, pose a risk to artists, though. 
It really only stands to intensify a negative response to their association with a 
particular ideology.146 There must be some sort of associating act that spurs the 
negative response. This is where decontextualization in the realm of political 
campaigns becomes important. When a candidate plays a song at their rally or 
a local political party uses a piece of music in a partisan advertisement, that 
association is created.147 As was noted by the court in Browne v. McCain,
observers of these practices could very well be confused as to whether the artist 
has endorsed the candidate or campaign.148 Upon the occurrence of that 
association, the artist has then been made a party, unwillingly, to a caustic 
political struggle that has the capacity to tangibly affect their social and 
economic interactions and permanently affect the meaning of their work.149 In 
light of these realities, the need for substantive moral rights for musical artists 
is clear.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Given these turbulent political dynamics and the increasing pressure they 
create for artists, a new moral rights framework for musical rights is necessary. 
Such a framework will require creating new statutory rights and addressing the 
contractual relationship between musicians, performing rights associations like 
ASCAP, and potential licensees. In doing so, a myriad of secondary issues will
need to be addressed as well, including: contractual waiver of moral rights; 
                                                                                                                     
144 Id.
145 Id. (“[P]artisan cues now also influence decisions outside of politics and that 
partisanship is a political and social divide.”); Christopher McConnell et al., Research: 
Political Polarization Is Changing How Americans Work and Shop, HARVARD BUS. REVIEW
(May 19, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/research-political-polarization-is-changing-how-
americans-work-and-shop [https://perma.cc/42ap-8ZRQ] (describing how political 
polarization and negative sentiments between members of different parties have begun to 
shape economic as well as political behavior).
146 See Rob LeDonne, Performing Is a Political Statement’: Who Will Play at Donald 
Trump’s Inauguration?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/dec/28/trump-inauguration-music-performances-beach-boys [https://perma.cc/VM
K3-6JUB] (illustrating the risks artists take by outwardly supporting a political candidate).
147 See Luke O’Neil, Can’t Always Get What You Want: Why Artists Struggle to Stop 
Politicians Using Their Songs, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2018/oct/30/pharrell-trump-music-politicians-bands-cease-desist [https://perma.cc/2DV6-
G6Z3].
148 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
149 See LeDonne, supra note 146.
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reconciliation with existing statutes; appropriate remedies; and standards of 
review. Though this is an inherently difficult enterprise, it is imperative that 
Congress take action. This proposal will begin with a discussion of some 
preliminary issues, such as the appropriate philosophical and practical starting 
point and previous proposals by other commentators. It will then offer a 
potential legislative text. Finally, it will conclude with a discussion of how the 
proposed text addresses the primary and secondary issues mentioned above.
A. Previous Proposals
Previous commentators have proposed the creation of moral rights for 
musical works. Rajan Desai was one of the first to discuss the 
decontextualization of music and propose moral rights as a potential remedy for 
this problem.150 Desai was preoccupied with music licensing, and his proposal 
focused primarily on two changes to existing law.151 First among those changes 
is an amendment to the copyright code that would require artist consent for 
synchronization (“synch”) licenses.152 This new right would be waivable, if the 
artist is comfortable doing so.153 The second prong of Desai’s proposal is meant 
to address the loss of control by artists over how their music is used in 
performances and involves the creation of a cause of action for artists “based on 
the moral right of integrity in order to control how their music is used and 
prevent the use of their music in a context they find objectionable.”154 With 
respect to remedies, Desai proposed injunctive relief against both licensors and 
licensees as the primary means of recourse and “monetary damages” if violators 
repeatedly violated an artist’s rights.155
In the years since Desai’s original proposal, his licensing-focused approach 
has been subject to a fair amount of criticism.156 For example, Sarah Anderson
objected to the lack of clarity in Desai’s proposal. The scheme, Anderson wrote,
is entirely devoid of any clear standards that courts can use to assess alleged 
violations of an artist’s moral rights.157 Second, and more importantly, both 
rights created under his system would be subject to waiver.158 Anderson astutely 
points out that given the inherent disparity in bargaining power between artists 
and publishers, leaving open the possibility of waiver effectively destroys any 
                                                                                                                     
150 Desai, supra note 17, at 19–23.
151 Anderson, supra note 17, at 888–89.
152 Desai, supra note 17, at 21. “Synchronization, or ‘synch,’ licenses . . . allo[w] the 
licensee to use (or synchronize) a musical work in an audiovisual work, such as a motion 
picture or television show.” Id. at 9.
153 Id. at 21.
154 Anderson, supra note 17, at 888–89. This right would be waivable as well. Id.
155 Desai, supra note 17, at 22–23.
156 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 17, at 890–93.
157 Id. at 890.
158 Id. at 891–92.
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rights that might have been created.159 These critiques make clear that any new 
proposal would need to contain clearer standards and rights that are not entirely 
subject to contractual waiver.
B. Finding a Proper Starting Point
In crafting this new proposal, there are a number of clear potential 
foundations on which to build. Among the options would be the Berne 
Convention, the Visual Artists Rights Act, and the moral rights provisions of 
some foreign jurisdictions, like France. For these purposes, the Berne 
Convention appears to be the obvious choice. Article 2 of the Berne Convention 
already includes “musical compositions with or without words” in its definition 
of protected works.160 This inclusion is an indication that the drafters of the 
moral rights provisions in Article 6bis were mindful of the special challenges 
presented by musical works and still considered them compatible with the rights 
conferred. As will be discussed below, that mindfulness is reflected in certain 
distinctions between the Berne Convention and these other frameworks, which 
ultimately makes the Berne Convention more advantageous.
While it does not identify them as such, the Berne Convention creates both 
a right of attribution and a right of integrity.161 Substantively, these rights are 
very similar to those granted to authors of visual works under VARA.162
However, there are some important differences, namely the catch all phrases at 
the end of the lists describing changes that might constitute a violation of an 
author’s rights.163 The Berne Convention’s inclusion of “other derogatory 
action” in addition to distortion, mutilation, and modification is valuable for the 
protection of musical works from decontextualization. All three of those terms 
carry with them a connotation of more tangible alteration of a work, which 
would seem to place decontextualization outside the scope of actionable 
conduct. However, “other derogatory action” is an incredibly broad term, 
sufficiently open to interpretation to cover acts of decontextualization. The 
Berne Convention provides this greater coverage, while still being functionally 
                                                                                                                     
159 Id. at 892.
160 Berne Convention, supra note 55, at art. 2(1). 
161 Id. at art. 6bis(1). 
162 Compare id. at art. 6bis(1) (“[T]he author shall have the right to claim authorship of 
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation.”), with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1990) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art shall 
have the right to claim authorship of that work . . . and . . . to prevent . . . intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation . . . .”).
163 Compare Berne Convention, supra note 55, at art. 6bis(1) (including “other 
derogatory action” that would be prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation), with 17 
U.S.C. § 106A(a) (including “other modification” that would be prejudicial to the author’s
honor or reputation).
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compatible with the rights created by VARA and the jurisprudence that has 
developed since its enactment.
In addition to the scope of actionable conduct, Anderson has pointed out 
some compelling reasons why extending VARA to cover musical works would 
not resolve the issue of decontextualization.164 First, Congress intended VARA 
to provide protection for artists’ professional rather than personal reputations.165
Second, VARA was primarily designed for, and expressly limited to, “works 
created in single copies or in limited editions.”166 This limitation would seem to 
exclude musical works due to the fact that they are essentially infinitely 
reproducible.167 Finally, VARA contains a number of exceptions for conduct 
that would normally be considered violative of the right of integrity.168 One such 
exception is for public presentation. The exception states that the “modification 
of a work that is the result of ‘the public presentation . . . of the work is not a 
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification . . . unless the 
modification is caused by gross negligence.’”169 While revising the definition
of works covered by VARA might seem like the simplest and most expeditious 
method for extending moral rights to musical works, a closer look at the nuances 
of the Act reveal that it would not be a sound starting point for the creation of 
moral rights for musical works.
Commentators often point to France’s highly developed and progressive 
moral rights regime as an exemplar.170 The French moral rights regime 
comprises four distinct rights.171 In addition to the rights of attribution (droit a 
la paternite) and integrity (droit au respect de l’oeuvre), France recognizes two 
other moral rights. The droit de divulgation allows an artist to decide whether 
to publish, and the droit de retrait ou de repentir allows an author to withdraw 
or modify a work that has already been published.172 Together, the extent of the 
control created by these four rights would be unheard of in the United States and 
seem almost absurd given the American preoccupation with economic rights.173
Any attempt to translate those rights to American jurisdictions, given the 
                                                                                                                     
164 Anderson, supra note 17, at 893–97.
165 Id. at 894. Any claim involving decontextualization, particularly of the form 
discussed in this note, would necessarily involve concerns about the artist’s personal 
reputation, but Congress expressly disclaimed any interest in resolving cases where “the 
general character of the plaintiff is at issue,” deeming it “irrelevant.” Id. (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 101-514, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6925).
166 Id. at 894; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (explaining that works of visual art “exist[] in single 
copy” or “in limited edition”).
167 Anderson, supra note 17, at 894–95.
168 Id. at 895.
169 Id.
170 See, e.g., Russel J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison 
of Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 1 
(1980).
171 Id. at 3. 
172 Id.
173 Ross, supra note 57, at 364.
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philosophical disparities between the two countries,174 would be difficult to 
reconcile with existing law and hard to justify from practical standpoint.
For the foregoing reasons, the substantive rights described in the Berne 
Convention will serve as the basis for this proposal. Even so, it will draw 
significantly from parts of VARA in order to create a moral rights regime for 
musical works that is compatible with that of visual works and easily interpreted 
in light of American jurisprudence. Article 6bis, though, leaves unaddressed 
some of the significant doctrinal issues discussed above, namely contractual 
waiver, standards of review, and remedies.175 Those issues will be addressed by 
the proposed legislative text in the next subpart. Following the proposed text 
will be an explanation of how it addresses those remaining questions. Finally, 
this part will conclude with a discussion of how this proposed legislation would 
reconcile with existing moral rights protections in the United States and how it 
is well-tailored to address the forms of decontextualization discussed in this 
note.
C. Proposed Legislative Text
Below is a proposed statutory text that would create rights for authors of 
musical works sufficient to guard against the harms of decontextualization. In 
addition to creating these rights, it contains provisions that address contractual 
modification of those rights and enforcement mechanisms.
Rights of authors of musical works to attribution and integrity:
(a) Rights of attribution and integrity--The author of a musical work--
(1) Shall, independent of their economic rights, have the right--
(A) to claim authorship of the work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any 
musical work which he or she did not create;176
(2) Shall have the right to prevent177 any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, 
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.
(b) Scope and exercise of rights--Only the author of a musical work has the    
rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the 
                                                                                                                     
174 Id. at 369.
175 See Berne Convention, supra note 57, at art. 6bis(1).
176 The Berne Convention does not contain this specific language. It is one of the ways 
in which the provisions of VARA go beyond the substantive rights described in the Berne 
Convention. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(B) (1990). However, this extension of the right of 
attribution is not, in any way, contradictory to the provisions of the Berne Convention.
177 When describing the right of integrity, the Berne Convention states that the artist has 
the right to “object to” any distortion, mutilation, modification, or other derogatory action. 
Berne Convention, supra note 55, at art. 6bis(1). This language is noticeably softer than the 
“prevent” language used in VARA. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). To reinforce the strength of 
the right created under this provision, the prevent language was substituted for the object 
language.
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author is the copyright owner. The authors of a joint work are co-
owners of the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work.
(c) Transfer and waiver. The rights conferred in subsection (a)--
(1) May not be transferred or waived through a written instrument 
signed by the author.178
(2) Ownership of the rights conferred in subsection (a) with respect to 
a musical work is distinct from ownership of any copy of that work, or 
of a copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright in that work. 
Transfer of ownership, or of a copyright or any exclusive right under a 
copyright, shall not constitute a waiver of the rights conferred by 
subsection (a).179
(d) Duration of rights. With respect to musical works created on or after 
effective date of this Act, the rights conferred by subsection (a) shall 
endure for a term consisting of the life of the author.
(e) Remedies. Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under 
this Act may--
(1) grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem 
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of the rights conferred 
therein;
(2) grant compensatory damages in accordance with any reputational 
harm suffered by the plaintiff; and
(3) award punitive damages as needed to vindicate the rights of authors 
of musical works.
The following subparts contain more thorough explanations how these 
statutory provisions will resolve lingering concerns about the creation and 
enforcement of moral rights for authors of musical works.
D. Contractual Waiver
Subsection (c) of this proposal is arguably its most important and 
controversial element. When Desai attempted to provide a solution for the 
problem of decontextualization, his proposal made the artists’ rights 
waivable.180 However, as others have pointed out, reliance on waivable rights 
in an industry where there are significant disparities in bargaining power in the 
                                                                                                                     
178 This provision is one of the most important and substantial diversions from VARA. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (providing that moral rights “may not be transferred, but those 
rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument 
signed by the author.”).
179 This exact provision appears in VARA. Id. § 106A(e)(2). However, it contains an 
explicit exception allowing an author to transfer of moral rights through written agreement. 
Id. Effectively, it is a statutory acknowledgement of the separability of moral and economic 
rights and the inalienable nature of moral rights. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying 
text.
180 Desai, supra note 17, at 19–23.
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negotiation of marketing and licensing agreement is an ineffectual approach.181
While this would certainly be a substantial diversion from existing moral rights 
doctrines, it is necessary in order create functional protections for musical 
works. Desai even acknowledges that it would be difficult for most artists to 
seek protection through contractual provisions because they are often so 
desperate to be published that they will make significant concessions to ensure 
a recording deal.182 This problem is particularly acute in the case of newer 
musicians who lack significant prior success.183 While there may be some 
instances where sufficiently powerful musicians are able to negotiate substantial 
moral rights protections in their licensing and publishing agreements,184
statutory limitations are necessary to constrain publishers and performance 
rights societies from extracting rights from artists.
E. Standards of Review
Taken as a whole, VARA is not suitable for extension to musical works, but 
it still holds tremendous value in for musical works in that it has given rise to a 
substantial body of case law on moral rights.185 Having been in place for nearly 
thirty years, VARA has been discussed, at least in part, by most federal circuit 
courts.186 Courts have had the opportunity to discuss the meaning of specific 
provisions of VARA.187 But more importantly, courts have had a chance to 
grapple with the values and principles underlying moral rights doctrine.188
Thus, courts will not only have VARA precedents to draw on for certain 
factual situations but they will also generally be more comfortable interpreting 
                                                                                                                     
181 See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
182 Desai, supra note 17, at 18.
183 Id.; Symposium, supra note 74, at 131–32.
184 Symposium, supra note 74, at 136.
185 See, e.g., Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining 
that a local garden did not have the type of authorship and stable fixation necessary to qualify 
for protection under VARA); Mass. Museum of Contemp. Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 
F.3d 38, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2010) (discussing whether unfinished works qualify for protection 
under VARA); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 129 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that VARA does not provide protection for site-specific works); Pollara v. 
Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 265–66 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing how a hand-painted banner that 
commissioned to draw attention to a lobbying effort falls outside the scope of VARA).
186 See cases cited supra note 185.
187 See, e.g., Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The right 
of integrity allows the author to prevent any deforming or mutilating changes to his 
work . . . .”).
188 See, e.g.,
The rights spring from a belief that an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit 
into the work and that the artist’s personality, as well as the integrity of the work, should 
therefore be protected and preserved. . . . Because they are personal to the artist, moral 
rights exist independently of an artist’s copyright in his or her work.
Id.
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the substantive provisions of this new legislation, given that the rights conferred 
under it are so similar to those created under VARA.189
F. Remedies
The inclusion of a particularized remedy section might seem somewhat 
unusual, given that violations of other rights associated with copyrightable 
works are consolidated in one chapter of Title 17.190 However, given the unique 
nature of the works in question, and that the goal for this note is to propose the 
best possible solution for decontextualization of musical works, adjusting and 
adding to traditional copyright remedies is necessary. Injunctive relief is both a 
traditional and unobjectionable remedy, necessary to curtail any present or 
impending violations of an author’s rights.191 Compensatory damages are a 
common remedy for copyright violations, but they are typically meant to 
address economic losses.192 The damages described in this proposal, though, are 
non-economic and intended to compensate the plaintiff for reputational harm in 
the same way plaintiffs in defamation suits are compensated for reputational 
harm.193 Given that the rights in question here are non-economic, the inclusion 
of non-economic compensatory damages in place of economic compensatory 
damages is a reasonable approach and necessary to vindicate the rights of 
musicians.
The real potential sticking point with respect to remedies in this proposal, 
however, will be the inclusion of punitive damages. Punitive damages are 
inherently controversial topic, and many parties are naturally averse to them.194
As such, their inclusion in a statutory proposal to vindicate a set of rights that 
are neither well-known nor well-settled is naturally controversial. Punitive 
                                                                                                                     
189 See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
190 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–513 (2006).
191 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006). Under the Copyright Act, injunctions may be 
granted in order to “prevent or restrain” copyright infringement, indicating that they are used 
to address both presently occurring and future violations. See id.
192 See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual 
damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer 
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the 
actual damages.”).
193 50 AM. JUR. 2D, Libel and Slander § 353 (2017) (stating that defamation suit 
plaintiffs are often entitled to “general damages, or those which the law presumes to be the 
natural, proximate, and necessary result of the publication and which represent such effects 
of the defamation as loss of reputation, shame, mortification, and hurt feelings”).
194 See generally Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages: 
Deterrence Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 834 (1989) (arguing that punitive 
damages are not subject to measurement or effective limits); Cass R. Sunstein et al., 
Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law) (Coase-
Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 50, 1997) (describing the award of punitive 
damages as arbitrary and unpredictable).
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damages are often valued for their deterrent effect.195 The harm that inspired 
this note, the decontextualization of music in political settings, is particularly 
difficult to control. Injunctive relief, while adequate to constrain the 
unauthorized uses of music, comes with inherent delays. Plaintiffs must not only 
jump through the procedural hurdles of filing a claim in court, which would 
require that they be notified of the unauthorized use, but also be able to 
demonstrate a “likelihood of success on the merits,”196 which would be difficult 
in a relatively unsettled area of law. Furthermore, injunctive relief only 
constrains future harm, which in cases where there has already been an 
unauthorized use, may be wholly ineffective. Therefore, the best and perhaps 
only way to resolve the issue of unauthorized uses of music is to deter the 
practice altogether through the use of punitive damages.
G. Reconciliation with Existing Moral Rights Doctrine
Presently, the biggest concern with respect to reconciliation involves 
making sure that this new legislation would not disrupt the existing protections 
for visual works in VARA. The substantive rights created under this new act are 
easily recognizable as very similar to those in VARA,197 which should mean 
that the judicial interpretations of those rights would be undisturbed. The most 
substantial differences between VARA and this new legislation relate to more 
ancillary issues, such as contractual waiver198 and remedies.199 While not 
insignificant, these differences should not interfere with or complicate the 
enforcement of rights created under VARA.
                                                                                                                     
195 See Lisa M. Broman, Comment, Punitive Damages: An Appeal for Deterrence, 61 
NEB. L. REV. 651, 653 (1982) (“[D]eterrence and punishment are companion policies 
justifying punitive damages.”); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When 
and How Much, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1146 (1988) (“A consensus among legal scholars 
holds that deterrence, along with punishment, is the goal of punitive damages.”). But see 
Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products 
Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 70 (1985) (“It is not so clear, however, that the deterrence 
rationale supports the imposition of punitive damages on product manufacturers.”).
196 O’Toole v. O’Connor, 802 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2015) (describing a four-part test 
for injunctive relief that requires the plaintiff to show (1) a likelihood of success on the 
merits, (2) that she will likely suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, (3) that the 
balance of equities favors her, and (4) that injunctive relief would serve the public interest).
197 See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. It should be emphasized again, 
though, that the right of integrity created under this new legislation is somewhat broader than 
that created under VARA due to the inclusion of the “other derogatory action” language. See 
supra note 159 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 190–96 and accompanying text.
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H. Resolving Decontextualization of Music in Political Settings
The foregoing proposal was created in response to and with the intention of 
resolving decontextualization of music in political settings. To that end, one of 
its most important characteristics remains the inclusion of the “other derogatory
action” language from Article 6bis of the Berne Convention in its articulation 
of the right of integrity. Looking at the other terms that precede that catch-all 
phrase; distortion, mutilation, and modification; it could be argued that playing 
a particular musical work in a political context would not be covered by the Act.
Even the broadest of the three, modification, would need to be stretched to its 
logical limits to cover this particular type of conduct.
After creating suitable substantive rights, the proposal’s next most 
important quality has to be the statutory prohibition against waiver of those 
rights through written agreements. Contractual relationships, from record deals 
to licensing agreements, are utilized heavily in the music industry.200 Given the 
serious disparities in bargaining power between most artists and the entities with 
which they negotiate these contracts, a statutory limit on the waiver of an artist’s
moral rights is indispensable.201 Otherwise, the creation of those rights would 
be a pointless enterprise.
Finally, in order for any right to be valuable, it must carry a legitimate 
prospect of enforcement. To that end, the proposal utilizes a three-tiered remedy 
structure, which provides for injunctive relief, non-economic relief, and punitive 
damages, to curtail unauthorized uses and, to the extent possible, restore the 
artist to a point preceding the violation of their rights. Injunctive relief is 
necessary to stop both known and prospective violators, thus preventing or 
confining the damage done to the artist’s work and reputation.202 Non-economic 
compensatory damages, while not a perfect solution, provide a means of 
restoring the artists to a point prior to the violation.203 And given the serious, 
persistent, and omnipresent threat of decontextualization, punitive damages will 
be an important part of enforcing any moral rights legislation by deterring 
potential bad actors.204
VII. CONCLUSION
Presently there is an absence of suitable doctrines to resolve the issue of 
unauthorized uses of music in political campaigns. Establishing a functional 
moral rights doctrine that applies to musical works should go a long way toward 
fixing this problem. Attempting to mold artists’ complaints to fit within 
longstanding intellectual property doctrines simply is not a feasible approach 
                                                                                                                     
200 See Desai, supra note 17, at 3–11.
201 Id. at 8, 11; Symposium, supra note 74, at 37.
202 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text.
2019] THE DECONTEXTUALIZATION OF MUSIC 649
moving forward.205 Furthermore, relying on the ability of authors to contract for 
their moral rights simply does not account for the interests of authors who lack 
significant bargaining power.206 If the United States ever wants to live up to its 
obligations under the Berne Convention, it must commit to a shift in its 
paradigm regarding the rights of authors of copyrightable works.
The true value of this Note may come not from its proposed statutory
reforms but rather from its contribution to that effort to raise awareness of moral 
rights. As was noted in the Copyright Office’s Notice of Inquiry, there is a 
general lack of awareness on behalf of both artists and art consumers of the 
doctrine of moral rights.207 A statutory remedy is helpful only if people are 
aware and understand what it is designed to accomplish. Such being the case, if 
this note can contribute to the public discourse on and help raise awareness of 
moral rights, it may have some value independent of its proposed legislative 
remedy.
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